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Abstract 
  Models of meaning making and post-traumatic growth contend that traumatic events are 
catalysts for significant and long-lasting change in a person’s worldview—that is, their beliefs 
about social, metaphysical, theological, and political reality.  Nearly all tests of this contention 
have employed retrospective and cross-sectional methods. However, the limitations inherent in 
these designs preclude causal conclusions. The current study represents the first longitudinal, 
laboratory-based experimental examination of belief change following trauma exposure using the 
trauma film paradigm. Findings reveal that the trauma film paradigm can successfully induce 
posttraumatic affective responses with live news coverage of a mass trauma (i.e., the 2013 
Boston Marathon bombing), and that these affective responses are associated with retrospective 
accounts of having reexamined core beliefs.  However, neither experimental condition effected 
significant directly observable change in beliefs. We consider our findings through the lens of 
alternative theoretical accounts of posttraumatic response (i.e., meaning making theory, narrative 
theory, and terror management theory). Finally, we conclude by recommending that researchers 
employ the trauma film paradigm in future research on meaning making and posttraumatic 
change processes.  
Keywords:  
 Mass trauma, meaning making, posttraumatic growth, narrative theory, Boston 
Marathon bombing
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The 2013 Boston Marathon Attacks: An Experimental Investigation of Worldview Change 
Following Reminders of Mass Trauma 
 Traumatic events bring people face-to-face with the finitude of their humanity. Suddenly 
and unexpectedly, a person exposed to a traumatic event suffers the actual or threatened loss of 
life, loved ones, property, safety, or security. Cherished goals are derailed, life course 
trajectories are permanently altered, and a person’s understanding of the self, the world, and 
others is turned upside-down. A critical re-appraisal of one’s worldview ensues. Beliefs and 
worldviews that were taken for granted—the worthiness of the self, the goodness of others, the 
safety of the world, the nature of the divine, and the fairness of society—are suddenly violated. 
The safety, predictability, and meaningfulness of life are undermined, casting the trauma 
survivor into a world of doubt, fear, and uncertainty. The individual must then reconcile the 
troubling significance of the traumatic event with a set of beliefs that is cannot explain or 
account for it. For some, the pieces can never be put back together, and the trauma ignites a 
lifelong struggle with posttraumatic stress, anxiety, depression, and substance abuse. For others, 
however, a phoenix rises from the ashes: From the darkness of loss and suffering, a wiser and 
stronger person emerges, emboldened by the struggle and empowered by the lessons it offered.  
 This is the story of meaning making and posttraumatic growth that has been told in the 
psychological literature for three decades (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Park, 2010; Park & Folkman, 
1997; Taylor, 1983; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). It is a powerful and alluring narrative of 
change, empowerment, and resiliency. Just as these psychological models describe how victims 
find meaning after trauma, psychologists have themselves found meaningful work in subjecting 
this narrative to the tests of empirical research: The stories of suffering, overcoming, and 
redemption that run deep within the American psyche now fill the pages of the scholarly 
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literature (McAdams, 2006). As a result, posttraumatic growth and meaning making have 
become universal models of deliverance from the suffering and hardship of traumatic 
experience—discovered, tested, and proven by psychological science. 
 Or are they? Given that meaning making and posttraumatic growth lie at the nexus of a 
blossoming interest in positive psychology, American religious culture, and an abiding American 
belief in the capacity for the individual to overcome adversity, it is unsurprising that it has 
received significant interest from researchers in the United States (McAdams, 2006; Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The lived experiences of many trauma survivors, such as those that 
have been documented in qualitative research on coping and meaning making, underscore the 
importance and validity of the construct (e.g., Mattis, 2002; Morris, Shakespeare-Finch, & Scott, 
2012; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). On this basis, the “reality” of the process of meaning making 
or the phenomenon of posttraumatic growth would be hard to dispute. Nevertheless, much 
remains to be discovered concerning the mechanisms that drive the meaning making process and 
the experience of posttraumatic change. Additionally, concerns about the methods that have been 
used to create the current body of knowledge raise important questions about the validity of these 
widely embraced models (Frazier et al., 2009; Park, 2010).  
 The current study aims to advance an understanding of the cognitive sequelae of trauma 
through an experimental investigation of the ways in which exposure to a film of mass trauma 
(the 2013 Boston Marathon attacks). Theoretical work in trauma research provides many 
perspectives from which to generate hypotheses concerning the impact of highly stressful events 
on worldview change. Despite the great interest in and development of theoretical perspectives 
on meaning making and posttraumatic change, the methodological challenges affecting trauma 
research have compromised researchers’ capacity to rigorously test the hypotheses generated by 
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theory (Park, 2010). We begin by reviewing theories that incorporate hypotheses related to 
worldview change and trauma, including shattered assumptions theory (Janoff-Bulman, 1992), 
the posttraumatic growth model (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004), the meaning making model (Park, 
2010; Park & Folkman, 1997), and terror management theory (Arndt & Vess, 2008). We then 
summarize empirical research that has been undertaken to test these theories and models, 
drawing particular attention to the limitations of study designs that predominate in the meaning 
making literature. Finally, we introduce the film trauma paradigm as an innovative 
methodological approach that has yet to be employed in the study of meaning making and 
worldview change following exposure to trauma.  
Theoretical Approaches to Worldview Change following Trauma 
 Cognitive approaches to posttraumatic change find their contemporary origin in the work 
of Taylor (1983), Lazarus and Folkman (1984), and Janoff-Bulman (1992). The work of Taylor 
(1983) and Lazarus and Folkman (1984) drew attention to the critical role that appraisal plays in 
responses to trauma. These scholars recognized that events are traumas by virtue of their 
appraisal as such, and that there is no essential property of traumatic events that distinguishes 
them from non-traumatic events: What constitutes a trauma for one person might not constitute a 
trauma for another. Janoff-Bulman’s (1992) shattered assumptions theory, building on the work 
of Taylor (1983), recognized that illusory beliefs about the self and the world play a critical role 
in maintaining psychological well-being, and that trauma violates this protective worldview. 
Based on her research with victims of sexual assault, Janoff-Bulman (1989; 1992) identified the 
three assumptions most critical to well-being as the worthiness of the self, the benevolence of the 
world, and the meaningfulness of the world. Factor analytical research has not supported the 
psychometric integrity of this three-factor model, instead suggesting that world assumptions that 
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are affected by trauma might be more plentiful than shattered assumptions theory initially 
postulated (Elklit, Shevlin, Solomon, & Dekel, 2007; Kaler et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the 
essential theoretical underpinnings of the model—that traumatic events shatter deeply-held 
beliefs about the goodness and safety of the world—have remained enormously influential on 
later theoretical work.  
Perhaps the most underdeveloped aspect of shattered assumptions theory pertains to the 
rebuilding of the assumptive world following trauma. While Janoff-Bulman (1992) argues that 
recovery from trauma requires that the assumptive world be reconstructed, the mechanisms 
underlying how these processes are supposed to occur, and how or whether the pretraumatic 
assumptive world differs from the posttraumatic assumptive world, remain vague.  
Tedeschi and Calhoun’s (2004) posttraumatic growth model attempts to fill this 
theoretical gap. The posttraumatic growth model draws deeply from the wellspring of the 
distinctly American religio-cultural redemption narrative in recognizing that many individuals 
who experience trauma report leading more enlightened, meaningful, and satisfying lives as a 
result of having suffered from and struggled with the consequences of a traumatic event 
(McAdams, 2006; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Posttraumatic growth, like shattered assumptions 
theory, “implies an established set of schemas that are changed in the wake of trauma” (Tedeschi 
& Calhoun, 2004, p. 4). Calhoun and Tedeschi’s (1998) model posits that posttraumatic growth 
is preceded by a seismic event that causes emotional distress, challenges fundamental belief and 
goal schemas (comparable to the world assumptions in shattered assumptions theory), and 
upends autobiographical narratives. Though initially followed by distress management and 
rumination, trauma victims engage in cognitive processing with the aid of social support from 
others and acquaintance with cultural models for posttraumatic coping and growth. Ultimately, 
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schemas and worldviews are altered and autobiographical narratives reconfigured to 
accommodate the significance of the traumatic event, which provide a newfound sense of 
meaning and wisdom.  
Of course, not all change is positive, and some people might fail to successfully rebuild a 
worldview that adaptively accommodates the implications of the trauma. The meaning making 
model (Park, 2010; Park & Folkman, 1997), while allowing for the potential for posttraumatic 
growth as conceptualized by Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004), offers a descriptive framework for 
meaning making following trauma that draws indirectly from Festinger’s (1957) work on 
cognitive dissonance to highlight how traumatic events thrust individuals into having to reconcile 
the seemingly irreconcilable. The meaning making model posits that an individual’s global 
meaning is comprised of beliefs and goals that guide behavior and are tied to the individual’s 
identity. Life events are appraised for their situational meaning, or the extent to which they 
impact an individual’s beliefs, goals, and sense of purpose. For most events, global and 
situational meaning are congruent; the event is either aligned with the individual’s beliefs and 
goals or is minimally impacted by them. Traumatic events, however, carry situational meanings 
that violate global meaning; core beliefs are challenged and progress towards life goals are 
delayed or terminated. In this context, meaning making occurs through repeated attempts to 
resolve the discrepancy between global and situational meaning (Park, 2010). This occurs 
through cognitive processing, wherein either situational meanings are reframed in order to 
assimilate them into pre-existing global meanings, or global meanings are altered to 
accommodate the situational meaning of the traumatic event. According to this model, the 
elimination of discrepancies in meaning results in adaptive adjustment to the event.  
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 Shattered assumptions theory, the posttraumatic growth model, and the meaning making 
model find their theoretical origins in clinical trauma research. However, the concept of the 
worldview extends far beyond those routinely investigated by trauma researchers (see Koltko-
Rivera, 2004). Perhaps the most influential theoretical paradigm to shape our contemporary 
understanding of worldviews has been terror management theory (Arndt & Vess, 2008; 
Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Terror management theory, which finds its 
conceptual roots in existential philosophy, psychodynamic theory, and evolutionary psychology, 
begins with the premise that humans have an awareness of their own mortality that causes fear of 
death and distressing feelings of existential anxiety. Individuals seek symbolic immortality to 
combat this terror through the defense and maintenance of robust self-esteem and a meaningful 
cultural worldview. Viewed through the lens of shattered assumptions theory, maintaining self-
esteem and defending a cultural worldview have much in common with believing in an 
assumptive world where the self is worthy and the world is meaningful. Unlike shattered 
assumptions theory, however, terror management theory has primarily attended to the ways in 
which mortality salience impacts changes in beliefs concerning in-group solidarity, political and 
cultural identity, and intergroup relationships (Arndt & Vess, 2008; Greenberg et al., 1995; 
Pyszczynski et al., 2006).  
Increasingly, scholars have ventured to bridge the gap between meaning making research 
and terror management theory. Edmondson and colleagues (2011) made the connection between 
the two more concrete by drawing attention to the anxiety buffering role that worldviews have in 
warding off the fear of death and the relationship that the loss of such defenses have to PTSD 
symptomatology. Traumas of a social or political nature (e.g., traumas caused by criminal acts, 
combat, or terrorism) might effect changes in beliefs that are frequently studied in terror 
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management research but that receive less attention in the meaning making literature, such as 
those related to in-group identification. For instance, Iranian students given a mortality salience 
prime were more likely to support religious martyrdom compared to controls, whereas American 
students given a mortality salience prime became more supportive of American military as 
compared to controls (Pyszczynski et al., 2006). Likewise, mortality salience primes have been 
shown to lead individuals to stereotype out-group members and humanize in-group members 
(Schimel et al., 1999; Vaes, Heflick, & Goldenberg, 2010). While researchers have sought to 
explore how worldviews change following exposure to war or terrorist attacks (e.g., Butler et al., 
2005; Freh, Chung, & Dallos, 2013), these studies have not assessed worldviews central to self-
construal that might be affected by traumatic confrontations with death, such as cultural 
identification, that have been commonly studied in the terror management literature. The 
incorporation of measures that assess cultural identity in the study of posttraumatic worldview 
change would allow for making further theoretical ties between the clinical and experimental 
meaning making and worldview literatures. 
Methodological Limitations in Research on Worldviews after Trauma 
As reviewed, the literature offers a cornucopia of theoretical perspectives on worldview 
change following trauma. While empirical work has endeavored to test hypotheses drawn from 
these rich theoretical frameworks, the methodologies employed to do so have come under 
increased scrutiny in recent years.  Frazier and colleagues (2009) highlight that scholars 
investigating meaning making and posttraumatic growth have primarily based their conclusions 
regarding the frequency of posttraumatic growth, the impact of posttraumatic growth on well-
being, and the mechanisms underlying meaning making on findings from retrospective self-
report studies, wherein participants are asked to undertake the mental gymnastics of recalling 
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aspects of the pre-trauma self, recalling aspects of the post-trauma self, comparing the two, 
determining whether or not growth occurred, and then assessing the extent to which this growth 
was attributable to the traumatic event. Given the (disputed) impact of trauma on 
autobiographical recall (Berntsen & Rubin, 2014) and the propensity for some individuals to 
derogate their past selves following trauma (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000), retrospective 
approaches to the study of posttraumatic change have come under increased scrutiny (Frazier et 
al., 2009; Kaler et al., 2008). Given the breadth of studies that have employed this 
methodology—indeed, such research comprises the near-totality of empirical work on shattered 
assumptions theory through the 1990s and early 2000s—a full review of this literature is well 
beyond the scope of this paper. In summarizing her review of the meaning making literature, 
Park (2010) notes that the dearth of prospective designs and the reliance on retrospective self-
report constitute a significant limitation to the advancement of a science of meaning making and 
posttraumatic change. 
 As a result of these critiques, the trauma literature has seen an increase in published 
studies utilizing prospective and longitudinal designs to investigate meaning making and 
posttraumatic change. While this change is welcome, methodological limitations remain. 
Prospective designs can be costly: Given that only a minority of participants recruited in such a 
study will experience a trauma during the course of the study, significant effort and resources are 
expended recruiting participants who will not experience a trauma during the course of the study. 
While this can be counteracted by extending the duration of a prospective longitudinal study, this 
too adds burdensome costs to study design, and attrition becomes more problematic. For 
instance, Anders, Frazier, and Shallcross (2014), Frazier et al. (2009), Kaler et al. (2008), and 
Schuler and Boals (2015) each used an eight-week-long prospective longitudinal design to assess 
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how traumatic events experienced between baseline data collection and final data collection 
impacted changes to core worldview beliefs and relevant indicators of well-being: While their 
definitions of trauma varied slightly, these studies found, respectively, that 8.5% (Kaler et al., 
2008), 14.1% (Anders, Frazier, & Shalcross, 2014), 21.0% (Frazier et al., 2009), and 19.1% 
(Schuler & Boals, 2015) of non-attrited participants reported experiencing a significant trauma 
during the course of the study. Barring the rare occurrence of a mass trauma taking place in the 
midst of data collection (e.g., as in the case of the September 11th, 2001, and research conducted 
by Silver et al., 2002), researchers can expect that these costly study designs will yield small 
samples of individuals who have experienced a clinically significant trauma (Park, 2010). 
 Even researchers who have the resources to execute a well-designed prospective 
longitudinal design are limited in their ability to draw generalizable conclusions from their work. 
While the aforementioned longitudinal studies note many important limitations to their findings, 
such as the reliance on undergraduate samples and their self-reports of trauma, it is surprising 
that so little mention is made of the heterogeneity among reported traumas experienced as a 
limitation (Anders, Frazier, & Shallcross, 2014; Frazier et al., 2009; Kaler et al., 2008; Schuler & 
Boals, 2015). The possibility that different traumas effect different changes in different world 
assumptions due to the contexts under which the traumas occurred, and the implications for those 
traumas on the individuals involved, requires that traumatic events of a particular type be studied 
independently. Consider two hypothetical trauma victims: The first is a victim of sexual assault, 
and the second is an individual who recently lost a loved one to sudden illness. Can we compare 
worldview changes between these two individuals and justifiably claim that we are comparing 
apples to apples? The notion implicit in this research that the specific content of a traumatic 
event does not bear upon the worldviews affected by the event is neither argued by theory nor 
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supported by the data, but is rather a byproduct of researchers’ efforts to study events that are, by 
their nature, heterogeneous, unpredictable, and sufficiently rare.  
 Finally, reliance on cross-sectional designs has prevented researchers from exploring the 
persistence of alterations to worldviews. This point is not trivial: If trauma does, in fact, change 
an individual’s worldviews, these changes might reflect substantive and permanent changes in 
personality; alternatively, they might be short-lived peritraumatic reactions that subside with 
time. Consider, for instance, that individuals who did not meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD one 
year after they had received a PTSD diagnosis that resulted from a traumatic injury had worse 
psychological, physical, social, and environmental quality of life than did individuals who never 
received a PTSD diagnosis (Bryant et al., 2015). If the residua of trauma include poor quality of 
life and a shattering of worldviews and global meaning, one wonders whether the reconstructed 
assumptive world that results from posttraumatic cognitive processing contributes to poorer 
quality of life and, if so, how. Yet, in the absence of longitudinal research that tracks worldviews 
well after a trauma has occurred, such questions will remain unanswered.   
The Trauma Film Paradigm: A Laboratory-Based Approach to Trauma Research 
 The limitations inherent in correlational and retrospective study designs can be overcome 
by implementing prospective and longitudinal designs in trauma research, but even these study 
designs do not afford the control that experimental designs can offer.  Whereas trauma research 
in the fields of meaning making and belief development have emphasized prospective and 
longitudinal designs (e.g., Frazier et al., 2009; Park, 2010), researchers interested in the clinical, 
biological, and neurological sequelae of trauma have increasingly studied these phenomena in 
the laboratory through the use of the trauma film paradigm (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). The 
trauma film paradigm is an experimental analogue study design that uses videos with pseudo-
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traumatic content to induce peritraumatic responses among study participants. While such a 
design forfeits the ecological validity of a self-report study, it offers researchers the ability to 
standardize a “traumatic” event and determine when, where, and how it takes place. Pre-film 
measures are administered to collect prospective data and these measures are re-administered 
post-film to assess how target outcomes were affected by the film. After the film, longitudinal 
data can be collected to examine the long-term impact of the manipulation.  
The trauma film literature has reliably demonstrated the ability of the technique to induce 
peritraumatic responses such as negative mood, distress, intrusive thoughts, and state 
dissociation (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Researchers have made use of Steil’s (1996) 12min 30s 
compilation of five road accidents to explore the impact of viewing this potentially traumatic 
video on intrusive thoughts, emotional reactivity, state dissociation, heart rate, and cortisol 
(Chou, La Marca, Steptoe, & Brewin, 2014; Clark, Mackay, & Holmes, 2015; Holmes, Brewin, 
& Hennessey, 2004). Cinematic footage has also been used in trauma film paradigm research 
(e.g., the rape scene from the 1988 film The Accused; Salters-Pedneault et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, recent research employing the trauma film paradigm has relied primary on Steil’s 
(1996) road traffic accident footage in the context of research on intrusive flashbacks. While the 
benefit of this approach allows scholars working within this field of research the ability to draw 
direct statistical comparisons across studies utilizing identical footage, the potential for this 
literature to become over-reliant on a single quasi-traumatic stimulus runs the risk of narrowing 
the generalizability of the literature’s findings to traumatic events that do not involve road traffic 
accidents. The rapid film presentation of five unrelated traumatic events (i.e., as in Steil, 1996) 
further lacks the ecological validity of a single traumatic experience.  
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 Moreover, Holmes and Bourne’s (2008) review of the use of the trauma film paradigm 
concentrates on the use of the method to test hypotheses derived from cognitive processing 
theories of PTSD that seek to describe the causal pathways and neural substrates that link 
visuospatial and verbal processing to PTSD-related symptomatology. It is noteworthy that they 
make no mention of implementing the technique to study trauma reactions of a social or political 
nature, even in brainstorming possible future applications of the trauma film paradigm (Holmes 
& Bourne, 2008). While Brewin, Bourne, Holmes, and their colleagues have not yet applied the 
trauma film paradigm to the study of meaning-making and posttraumatic change, few scholars 
working in these latter fields of research have given much credence to the experimental study of 
traumatic meaning making. Park (2010), in discussing the validity of shattered assumptions 
theory, states that the most methodologically robust way to empirical test its hypotheses would 
“ideally… occur in a randomized experimental context that would control for alternate 
explanations; such studies will almost certainly not be conducted” (p. 283). The trauma film 
paradigm, despite being an analog design, offers a framework for simulating such a study in an 
ethical fashion. Moreover, the application of the trauma film paradigm to meaning making and 
posttraumatic change research offers the opportunity to bridge the gap between traumatologists 
investigating cognitive processing of trauma and those who are studying meaning making and 
posttraumatic change processes. 
The Impact of Indirect and Televised Mass Trauma  
 Films such as those typically used in the trauma film literature (e.g., Steil, 1996) or 
cinematic representations of traumatic events (e.g., The Accused) can be used to expose 
individuals to traumatic content independent of an ecologically valid context (Holmes & Bourne, 
2008), but exposure to trauma vis-à-vis a computer or television screen can, and often is, a very 
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powerful and impactful experience. The advent of 24-hour cable news cycle brought horrifying 
images from wars, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks into the living rooms of millions of 
Americans. The majority of cable news viewers prove resilient to such images; however, a 
significant minority experience symptoms of PTSD as a result of indirect traumatic exposure 
through televised news broadcast (Neria & Sullivan, 2011). Research by Silver and colleagues 
(2004) has demonstrated that a person need not have had direct exposure to a mass trauma to 
suffer a harmful traumatic response: Following the 9/11 attacks, posttraumatic stress responses 
were experienced by individuals across the U.S. who were exposed to the event via media 
coverage. Galea and Resnick’s (2005) review of post-9/11 research on New York City residents 
found that while individuals directly affected by the 9/11 terrorist attacks were more likely to 
experience symptoms of PTSD as compared to those who were not directly affected, the overall 
PTSD symptom presentation between those who were directly affect and those who were 
indirectly affected was negligible. Repeated exposure to news coverage of terrorist attacks and 
war have been found to sustain accurate recall of these events (Hirst et al., 2015) and exacerbate 
posttraumatic stress associated with indirect trauma exposure (Silver et al., 2013).  
 Mass traumas differ from personal traumas in important ways. For those who are not 
directly affected, the harms and losses associated with mass traumas are often symbolic in nature 
and their experiences of them are affected by the damage rendered to communities, the violation 
or destruction of cherished landmarks and sacred spaces, and the ways in which these events are 
processed through and reflected by collective histories and cultural practices (Maček, 2014). 
Research suggests that meaning making following mass trauma shares many essential 
similarities with meaning making following personal trauma: Individuals who were searching for 
meaning in the 9/11 attacks were found to have higher levels of posttraumatic stress as compared 
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to individuals who had successfully found meaning in the event (Updegraff, Silver, & Holman, 
2008)—a finding that echoes research on personal traumas (Steger, Kashdan, Sullivan, & 
Lorentz, 2008). However, identification with a group affected by a mass trauma can play a 
significant role in how an individual responds to the event. A study of Spaniards’ emotional 
responses to the March 11th, 2004 Madrid train bombings found that respondents’ strongest 
emotions following the attacks were sadness, disgust, anger, and contempt, and that these 
emotions were significantly and positively correlated with Spanish cultural identification 
(Conejero & Extebarria, 2007). Morgan, Wisneski, and Skitka (2011) drew on value protection 
theory (Tetlock et al., 2000) and terror management theory (Arndt & Vess, 2008) to account for 
the role that cultural identification and worldview defense played in the negative (e.g., 
diminished civil liberties, discrimination towards Muslims, and war) and positive (e.g., blood 
donation, volunteerism, and political engagement) responses of the American public following 
the September 11th attacks. In light of the personal and collective impact that mass traumas have, 
the study of meaning making and posttraumatic change requires attention to changes in schemas 
that reflect personal worldviews (e.g., assumptive worldviews and a sense of meaning in life; 
Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kahler, 2006) alongside those that reflect 
sociocultural and political belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs and cultural identity; Leach et al., 
2008; Park, 2005).  
The Current Study 
Events such as the September 11th attacks and similar violent mass traumas that have 
followed—the Virginia Tech massacre, the Sandy Hook shootings, and the Boston Marathon 
bombings among them—are not merely traumatic in nature, but have significant ramifications 
for the mental health of the public and the social and political life of a society (Silver et al., 2004; 
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Maček, 2014; Morgan, Wisneski, & Skitka, 2011). Nevertheless, the putative impact that such 
events might have on individual-level belief systems remains understudied. Because past 
research has relied primarily on cross-sectional and retrospective designs, the long-term impact 
of trauma on belief change has been left to conjecture. Moreover, the emphasis on personal 
traumas among scholars of meaning making and posttraumatic change has left wanting a richer 
empirical analysis of the impact of mass trauma on these phenomena.  
The current study employs the trauma film paradigm to experimentally, prospectively, 
and longitudinally investigate belief change and meaning making following a simulated exposure 
to mass trauma. The two research questions that guide the current investigation are: 
1)! Can recorded news footage of a mass trauma be employed in a trauma film paradigm 
study to simulate a trauma response?  
2)! Can exposure to a film recording of a mass trauma produce short- and long-term changes 
in an individual’s beliefs, worldviews, or identity?  
Based on meaning making theory and past findings from the literature, we offer the following 
hypotheses: 
H1)! Participants in the trauma film (i.e., experimental) condition will experience more 
negative affect and distress than will participants in the non-trauma film (i.e., control) 
condition immediately following film exposure. 
H2)! Participants in the trauma film (i.e., experimental) condition will exhibit greater 
changes in beliefs and worldviews immediately following film exposure as compared 
to participants in the non-trauma film (i.e., control) condition. 
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H3)! Participants in the trauma film (i.e., experimental) condition will retrospectively report 
greater impact of the film on beliefs and worldviews compared to participants in the 
non-trauma film (i.e., control) condition. 
The 2013 Boston Marathon attacks 
To test these hypotheses, we used recorded news footage covering the 2013 Boston 
Marathon Bombings. On April 15th, 2013, two perpetrators detonated homemade explosive 
devices near the finish line of the 2013 Boston Marathon, killing three and injuring 264; these 
attacks constituted the first major terrorist attack on American soil since September 11th, 2001 
(Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, 2013). In the days following, police and 
federal investigators conducted a high profile manhunt that resulted in the death of one suspect 
and the apprehension of another (Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, 2013). 
Echoing past research on the distal impact of national traumas (e.g., Silver et al., 2004), a study 
of reactions to the Boston Marathon bombings in the United States found that Bostonians 
experienced the greatest levels of acute stress in the days and weeks following the attacks, but 
that the intense media coverage transmitted the harmful effects of this event well beyond the 
Boston metropolitan area (Holman, Garfin, & Silver, 2014). Owing to the recent occurrence of 
these events, the public’s widespread familiarity with them, and the significant impact they had 
on national stress, we chose to use footage from this event under the assumption that participants 
would be expected to experience a stress response as a result, and that the appraised meaning of 
this event would challenge assumptive worldviews and serve as a mortality salience prime. 
Methods 
Participants 
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 Participants were recruited from the University of Connecticut’s Psychology Department 
participant pool website during the Spring 2014 and Fall 2014 semesters. Due to the University 
of Connecticut’s proximity to Boston, it was possible that a prospective study enrollee might 
have been directly affected by the 2013 Boston Marathon attacks. To protect these students from 
potentially harmful re-exposure to this traumatic material, all participant pool members were 
prescreened with a single yes or no question which asked, “Did you or a loved one suffer direct 
physical and/or emotional harm as a result of the Boston Marathon attacks of April 15th, 2013?” 
Participants who responded “yes” to this question were prohibited from enrolling in the study. Of 
the 2,796 students in the participant pool, 98 (3.5%) responded “yes” to this prescreen. 
 One hundred and sixty-eight (74.0%) of the 227 participants who enrolled in the study 
completed surveys at all three time points and were retained for data analysis. Of these 168 
participants, women (n=136, 81.0%) outnumbered men (n=32, 19.0%). Participants had a mean 
age of 18.6 years (SD=0.99). One hundred and thirteen (67.3%) participants were White, 28 
(16.7%) were Asian or Asian American, 12 (7.1%) were Black or African American, 7 (4.2%) 
were multiracial, and 8 (4.8%) did not specify their race. First year college students (n=106, 
63.1%) comprised more than half of the sample. Ninety-four (56.0%) participants identified as 
Christian, among which 26 participants (27.7%) identified with a Protestant denomination, 46 
participants (48.9%) identified as Roman Catholic, and the remaining 22 participants (23.4%) 
did not identify with a specific Christian denomination. Thirty-two (19.1%) participants 
identified with no religion, 17 (10.0%) identified their religious affiliation as “other,” and the 
remaining 25 participants (14.9%) identified as either Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist.  
Tasks and Measures  
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 Trauma films. Two 10-min trauma films1 were selected for administration in the 
experimental condition and the control condition. The film selected for the experimental 
condition consisted of live CNN coverage of the 2013 Boston Marathon attacks as the event was 
unfolding on April 15th, 2013, reported by CNN news correspondent Wolf Blitzer. The film 
contains approximately 2.5 min of unsettling live amateur video of the first explosion and the 
reactions of victims and first responders, followed by approximately 7.5 min of in-studio news 
analysis of the amateur video. The film selected for the control condition consisted of recorded 
CNN coverage, aired on June 6th, 2013, of a discussion between two national security experts 
about the defection of former CIA contractor Edward Snowden. Both films were trimmed from 
their original lengths to 10 min to minimize method variance and set film lengths to be 
comparable to those typically used in the trauma film literature (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Films 
were selected to meet the desired criteria of being matched in terms of ecologically validity (i.e., 
real news footage) and style of presentation (i.e., CNN news broadcasts anchored by Wolf 
Blitzer). The films were also selected on the basis of their difference in content: Whereas the 
film in the experimental condition contained coverage and live images of a traumatic event of 
national scope, the control condition contained pre-recorded news analysis of a non-traumatic 
nature on a subject that we anticipated would be of comparatively minimal interest to 
participants. The films were displayed on a 43-cm Dell P170Sb monitor at a viewing distance of 
approximately 60cm. Participants listened to the videos with around-ear stereo headphones.   
 Attentional check. To assess the extent to which participants paid adequate attention to 
the films, we created a brief five-item true-or-false quiz to gauge retention of the film content. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!
1 The films used in the experimental and control conditions were retrieved from YouTube.com and modified for 
study purposes. The modified films can be accessed at https://osf.io/aikbp/. 
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Separate quizzes were developed for each film. The items of these quizzes and their correct 
answers are presented in Appendix A.  
 Assumptive worldviews. Non-religious worldviews were assessed with the World 
Assumptions Scale (WAS; Janoff-Bulman, 1989). The WAS contains eight 4-item subscales that 
measure beliefs about self-worth (e.g., “I am very satisfied with the kind of person I am”) luck 
(e.g., “I am luckier than most people”), randomness (e.g., “In general, life is mostly a gamble”), 
justice (e.g., “By and large, people get what they deserve in this world”), benevolence of the 
world (e.g., “If you look closely enough, you will see that the world is full of goodness”), 
benevolence of others (e.g., “People are basically kind and helpful”), controllability (e.g., 
“Through our action, we can prevent bad things from happening to us”), and self-control (e.g., “I 
take actions necessary to protect myself against misfortune”). Items were scored from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Research has supported the eight-factor structure of the WAS 
(Elklit et al., 2007).  
 National identity. National identity was measured with the Multicomponent In-Group 
Identification Scale (Leach et al., 2008). This measure allows for modification to measure five 
forms of in-group identification with a target social group: solidarity (“I feel a bond with [in-
group]”), satisfaction (“I think that [in-group] have a lot to be proud of”), centrality (“The fact 
that I am [in-group] is an important part of my identity”), self-stereotyping (“I am similar to the 
average [in-group] person”), and group homogeneity (“[in-group] people have a lot in common 
with each other”). To explore whether and how the experimental manipulation effected changes 
in worldviews related to cultural identity, we adapted this measure to assess changes in 
participants’ identity as Americans (hereafter, the American Identity Scale, or AIS). The AIS 
was only administered to participants who were born in the United States, held American 
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citizenship, lived most of their lives in the United States, or personally identified as American 
(n=163, 97.0%). Items were scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
 Meaning in life. Subjective sense of meaning in life was assessed with the Meaning in 
Life Questionnaire (MLQ; Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kahler, 2006). The MLQ contains two 5-
item subscales: search for meaning in life (e.g., “I am looking for something that makes my life 
feel meaningful”), and presence of meaning in life (e.g., “I have a good sense of what makes my 
life meaningful”). Items were scored from 1 (absolutely untrue) to 7 (absolutely true).  
Affective response to film. Affective responses to the films was measured at Time 2 with 
five of the eleven three-item subscales drawn from the expanded version of the Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1992). Four of the subscales chosen—fear, 
hostility, sadness, and surprise—were chosen on the basis of their relevance to affective 
responses typically experienced in response to trauma (e.g., Orth & Wieland, 2006; Resick & 
Miller, 2009). We included self-assurance, a form of affect with no anticipated relationship to 
mass trauma, as the fifth subscale in order to check for affective response bias. Items were scored 
on a six-point scale, from 0 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). 
Subjective distress. Subjective distress was measured with the Subjective Units of 
Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1969), a single-item measure of subjective distress. Participants 
were presented with a slider, scored from 0 to 100, accompanied with the following prompt: 
“Imagine that you have a ‘distress thermometer’ that measures your fear, anxiety, or discomfort 
on a scale from 0 to 100. Using this scale, please indicate the level of distress you are currently 
experiencing.” The SUDS was administered at Time 2 and Time 3. 
 Subjective appraisal of post-film response. Participants’ subjective appraisals of their 
own reactions to the experimental manipulation were assessed with the Impact of Events Scale 
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(IES; Weiss & Marmar, 1997) and the Core Beliefs Inventory (CBI; Cann et al., 2010) one 
month following the film administration at Time 3. The IES contains 22 items that assess 
participants’ stress-related physiological (e.g., “I had trouble staying asleep”), affective (e.g., 
“Any reminder brought back feelings about it”), and cognitive (e.g., “I tried not to think about 
it”) responses to a specific traumatic event. The instructions provided to participants for 
responding to the IES and CBI were dependent on the condition to which participants were 
assigned, such that participants in the experimental condition were asked to what extent the 
Boston Marathon attacks impacted them and led them to reflect on their core beliefs, and 
participants in the control condition were asked to what extent the government surveillance 
controversy impacted them and led them to reflect on their core beliefs.   Despite the scale’s 
inclusion of post-traumatic responses across symptom types, Weiss and Marmar (1997) found 
that scale items best fit a single factor (see also Cann et al., 2010). Items were scored on a five-
point scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely).  
Whereas the IES assesses the subjective experience of posttraumatic symptoms, the CBI 
assesses subjective assessments of worldview reexamination following trauma. Example items 
include, “Because of the event, I seriously examined the degree to which I believe things that 
happen to people are fair” and, “Because of the event, I seriously examined my beliefs about the 
meaning of my life.” The CBI contained nine items scored on a six-point scale from 0 (not at all) 
to 5 (to a very great degree).   
Procedure 
 Following from past trauma film paradigm research (Holmes & Bourne, 2008), the 
current study employed a longitudinal experimental design. Data were collected at three time 
points: pre-film (Time 1), immediately post-film (Time 2), and four weeks post-film (Time 3). A 
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schedule of study procedures, measures, and time points of administration is presented in Table 
1. Pre-film measures were administered online to assess participants’ beliefs, worldviews, and 
sense of meaning in life at baseline. At Time 2, participants came to the laboratory and were 
randomly assigned to either the experimental (i.e., Boston Marathon bombing film) or control 
(i.e., national security interview film) condition. After viewing the film, participants completed 
all Time 2 measures to assess the impact of the manipulation on beliefs, worldviews, meaning in 
life, distress, and affect. Finally, to assess whether the experimental manipulation had long term 
impacts on key outcomes of interest, participants completed a final battery of measures at Time 
3, which occurred one month following Time 2. We chose to administer Time 3 four weeks after 
Time 2 on the basis of the DSM-5’s stipulation that posttraumatic symptomatology must be 
present for at least one month in order for an individual to meet diagnostic criteria for 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Time 3 measures once 
again included our belief, worldview, and meaning measures in addition to our measures of 
distress and subjective post-event appraisal. The order of measure administration, and the order 
of items within each measure, were randomized for each participant to control for order effects. 
To ensure that prospective participants did not choose to enroll in the study on account of 
its focus on trauma, mild deception was used in describing the purpose of the study. During 
consent, participants were informed that they were “invited to participate in a research study to 
understand how exposure to televised news media impacts beliefs and attitudes,” and that “the 
video you will watch might contain news coverage of a disturbing or unsettling event.” 
Participants were not told that the intent of the study was to examine the impact of mass trauma 
on belief change.  To ensure that participants understood the potential for exposure to disturbing 
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material, participants were consented to the study at both Time 1 and Time 2. On completing the 
study at Time 3, participants were debriefed and informed of the use of deception.  
 All study procedures were approved by the University of Connecticut’s Institutional 
Review Board. The rationale, hypotheses, and materials for this study were preregistered at Open 
Science Framework prior to data collection (https://osf.io/cm6pt/).  
Results 
Hypothesis 1: Participants in the Experimental Condition will Experience Higher Levels of 
Negative Affect and Distress   
 The utility of the trauma film paradigm rests on the assumption that a traumatic film 
produces a psychological response that is commensurate with an ecologically valid experience of 
a traumatic event. Past research has made repeated use of films (e.g., Steil, 1996) that meet this 
standard (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Because the current study uses films that have yet to be 
validated, an analysis of findings must first establish the efficacy of the films employed. To do 
so, we ran independent samples t-tests comparing the differences in affective response on the 
PANAS-X and the SUDS following the film administration at Time 2. Means, standard 
deviations, and internal consistency coefficients are presented in Table 2. Findings revealed that 
participants in the experimental condition experienced significantly higher levels of fear 
(t(166)=11.12, p≤.001, d=1.72), hostility (t(166)=10.84, p≤.001, d=1.67), sadness (t(166)=17.40, 
p≤.001, d=2.69), surprise (t(166)=6.34, p≤.001, d=0.98), and subjective distress (t(166)=7.81, 
p≤.001, d=1.20) as compared to participants in the control condition. As expected, self-
assurance, a form of affect with no conceptual link to trauma exposure, did not differ between 
conditions, t(166)=0.27, p=n.s., d=0.04.  
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 To explore the possibility that differences in affective response to the videos was a 
byproduct of differences in attention, we compared the mean attentional check quiz scores of the 
two groups. This comparison revealed a significance difference, t(166)=4.01, p≤.001, d=0.62, 
with participants in the control condition (M=4.42, SD=0.75) having better scores than 
participants in the experimental condition (M=4.81, SD=0.45). A further analysis suggested that 
these differences in scores might have been primarily driven by the inclusion of a poor item in 
the attention check quiz in the experimental condition (i.e., “President Obama described the 
event as a ‘terrorist attack.’”), which was answer incorrectly by 29.4% of experimental condition 
participants. However, the observations that 70.2% (n=115) got all attentional items correct 
across conditions and that no participants answered fewer than three questions incorrectly 
suggest that participants paid adequate attention to and retained content from the films. 
Hypothesis 2: Participants in the Experimental Condition will Exhibit Greater Changes in 
Beliefs and Worldviews  
 Mixed model ANOVAs. Having established the efficacy of the manipulation as 
measured by negative affect and self-reported distress, we then investigated whether participants 
experienced differences in belief change as a function of time and condition. To do so, we ran a 
series of 2 (condition) by 3 (time) ANOVAs on our 15 belief and worldview measures: The eight 
subscales of the WAS, the five subscales of the AIS, and the two subscales of the MLQ. Within 
our application of the ANOVA framework, a significant interaction between time and condition 
would indicate support for H2; specifically, we would anticipate that, due to random assignment, 
beliefs and worldviews would not differ between groups at T1 and—if H2 holds true—beliefs 
would then differ between groups following the experimental manipulation at T2.  
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Findings from these analyses are presented in Table 3. A significant main effect for time 
was found for beliefs about justice, F(2, 498)=4.05, p≤0.05, ηp2=0.02, and for beliefs in self-
control, F(2, 498)=3.35, p≤0.05, ηp2=0.01. Post-hoc analysis of these differences using Tukey’s 
Honest Significant Difference (HSD) test revealed that, for beliefs about justice, the significant 
main effect of time was driven exclusively by a -.24 change in the mean score for justice beliefs 
across conditions between T1 and T2 (90% CI [-0.47, -0.02], p≤0.05). On further analysis, this 
change was found to be almost exclusively attributable to participants in the experimental 
condition. However, the difference in justice beliefs among this group between T1 and T2 
narrowly failed to meet conventional standards of statistical significance (90% CI [-0.38, 0.02], 
p=0.052). Post-hoc investigation found that the significant main effect of time on self-control 
beliefs was driven by a -.30 change in the mean score for self-control beliefs across conditions 
between T1 and T3 (90% CI [-0.50, -0.09], p≤0.01). We found no differences in this trend as a 
function of condition. 
A significant main effect for condition was found for beliefs about the benevolence of the 
world, F(1, 498)=4.98, p≤0.05, ηp2=0.01, the centrality of American identity, F(1, 498)=5.87, 
p≤0.05, ηp2=0.01, satisfaction with American identity, F(1, 498)=4.70, p≤0.05, ηp2=0.01, and 
perceived solidarity among Americans, F(1, 498)=4.82, p≤0.05, ηp2=0.01. While post-hoc 
analysis estimated participants in the experimental condition to have a .14 greater mean score for 
the benevolence of the world as compared to participants in the control condition, this difference 
was not statistically significant (95% CI [-.01, .29], p=ns). However, participants in the 
experimental condition had reliability stronger American identification across time points as 
compared to the control condition with respect to the centrality of American identification 
(MD=.24, 95% CI[.06, .43], p≤0.01), satisfaction with American identity (MD=.19, 95% CI[.08, 
 26 
.30], p≤0.001), and perceptions of in-group solidarity among Americans (MD=.20, 95% CI[.04, 
.35], p≤0.05). 
 No significant interactions were found between time and condition for any of the belief 
and worldview measures assessed, Fs(2, 498)≤1.15, ps=ns, ηp2s≤0.01.   
Residual belief change by condition from Time 1 to Time 2. Whereas mixed-model 
ANOVAs assess the observed average differences in belief scores across time and condition, 
residual change score modeling assesses the extent to which the experimental manipulation 
accounts for a significant proportion of instability in belief over time (for further discussion on 
the differences between difference score and residual change score models, see Gollwitzer, 
Christ, & Lemmer, 2014). Stated otherwise, residual change score modeling allows for the 
analysis of the impact of the experiment on post-manipulation beliefs above and beyond the 
impact of pre-manipulation beliefs. Given the established variability and change in beliefs 
experienced among emerging adult attending college (e.g., Bryant, 2010; Gutierrez & Park, 
2015), we would expect to observe changes in beliefs and worldviews among participants in our 
sample even in the absence of the experimental manipulation. Therefore, the analysis of residual 
change scores, rather than observed difference scores, allows for a more nuanced within-group 
assessment of the effects of the manipulation on belief change.  
 Residual change score regression models predicting our 15 belief outcomes (i.e., world 
assumptions, American identity, and meaning in life) for Time 2 are presented in Table 4. 
Models assessing residual belief change immediately following the experimental manipulation 
regressed Time 2 beliefs onto Time 1 beliefs, study condition, and an interaction term between 
Time 1 beliefs and study condition. Although residual change models regressing Time 2 world 
assumptions onto Time 1 world assumptions accounted for a significant proportion of variance in 
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Time 2 beliefs, Fs(2, 165)≥29.37, p≤.001, R2s≥0.26, the experimental condition did not 
significant predict residual belief change within these models.  
 Residual change models regressing Time 2 American identity beliefs onto Time 1 
American identity beliefs accounted for a significant proportion of variance in Time 2 beliefs, 
Fs(2, 160)≥56.00, p≤.001, R2s≥0.41. Experimental condition did not significant predict residual 
belief change within these models.  
 Residual change models regressing Time 2 meaning in life attitudes onto Time 1 meaning 
in life attitudes accounted for a significant proportion of variance in Time 2 beliefs, Fs(2, 
165)≥50.23, p≤.001, R2s≥0.39. Experimental condition did not significant predict residual belief 
change within these models.  
 Residual belief change by condition through Time 3. To subject the efficacy of our 
manipulation to the more rigorous test of assessing the long-term impact of experimental trauma 
exposure on belief and worldview change, we ran a series of regression models predicting Time 
3 beliefs from experimental condition, Time 2 beliefs, and Time 1 beliefs, in order examine the 
extent to which Time 3 beliefs can be predicted by baseline beliefs, immediate post-manipulation 
beliefs, and the impact of the experimental condition.  
 Residual change score regression models predicting our 15 belief outcomes (i.e., world 
assumptions, American identity, and meaning in life) for Time 3 are presented in Table 4. 
Residual change models regressing Time 3 world assumptions onto Time 1 and Time 2 world 
assumptions accounted for a significant proportion of variance in Time 3 beliefs, Fs(3, 
163)≥25.48, p≤.001, R2s≥0.32. In the model predicting Time 3 beliefs in the benevolence of 
people, experimental condition (b=0.17, SE=0.8, β=0.10, p≤.05) significantly accounted for a 
residual variance in belief change, F(3, 163)=69.58, p≤.001, R2=0.56. A scatterplot depicting 
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change in belief in the benevolence of people from Time 2 to Time 3 is presented in Figure 1.  
 Residual change models regressing Time 3 American identity beliefs onto Time 1 and 
Time 2 American identity beliefs accounted for a significant proportion of variance in Time 3 
beliefs, Fs(3, 159)≥62.14, p≤.001, R2s≥0.55. Experimental condition did not significantly predict 
residual belief change within these models. 
  Residual change models regressing Time 3 meaning in life beliefs onto Time 2 and Time 
1 meaning in life accounted for a significant proportion of variance in Time 3 beliefs, Fs(3, 
163)≥36.70, p≤.001, R2s≥0.40. In the model predicting Time 3 beliefs in the presence of meaning 
in life, experimental condition (b=0.28, SE=0.10, β=0.13, p≤.01) significantly accounted for a 
residual variance in belief change, F(3, 163)=94.23, p≤.001, R2=0.63. A scatterplot depicting 
change in presence of meaning in life from Time 2 to Time 3 is presented in Figure 2.   
Hypothesis 3: Participants in the Experimental Condition will Retrospectively Report 
Greater Impact of Film on Beliefs and Worldviews 
 Whereas our previous analyses tested hypotheses concerning objective belief change as a 
function of our experimental manipulation, our final analyses aimed to analyze participants’ 
retrospective and subjective appraisals of belief change as a function of experimental condition. 
We independently analyzed two measures that assess the subjective impact of a traumatic event: 
The Impact of Events Scale (IES; Weiss & Marmar, 1997), which assesses participants’ 
posttraumatic symptomatology and affective impact of a specific event, and the Core Beliefs 
Inventory (CBI; Cann et al., 2010), which measures the extent to which participants perceive an 
event as having reexamined their core beliefs and worldviews.  
 At Time 3, A two-sample t-test revealed no significant difference between conditions on 
the IES, t(163)=-1.30, p=ns, d=0.20, suggesting that the newsreel shown in the experimental 
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condition (M=1.59, SD=0.67) did not have a greater or lesser affective or clinical impact than 
did the newsreel shown in the control condition (M=1.75, SD=0.91). However, a two-sample t-
test revealed significant group differences between conditions with respect to perceived changes 
in core beliefs on account of the manipulation, t(161)=2.03, p≤.05, d=0.32, whereby participants 
in the experimental condition (M=2.37, SD=1.08) endorsed seriously re-examining their beliefs 
to a greater degree than did participants in the control condition (M=2.00, SD=1.24).  
 In light of the observation that the experimental and control conditions significantly 
differed in term of immediate post-manipulation affect and subjective core belief examination at 
one-month follow-up, we conducted a hierarchical linear regression to disentangle whether group 
differences in core belief examination at follow-up held after controlling for post-manipulation 
differences in affect. Findings from these analyses are presented in Table 5. In step one of the 
model, CBI is predicted exclusively from condition; following from the previously reported t-
test, condition significantly and positively predicts a significant proportion of variance in CBI 
scores, b=0.37, SE=0.18, p≤.05, and the step one model is significant, F(1, 161)=4.12, p≤.05, 
R2=0.02, Adjusted R2=0.02. In step two, we include regression terms for each of the five PANAS 
subscales administered at Time 2. After controlling for affect, experimental condition no longer 
predicted a significant proportion of variance in CBI scores, b=-0.12, SE=0.30, p=ns. Fear, 
hostility, and self-assurance were positive and significant predictors of CBI scores, bs≥0.22, 
SEs≤0.12, ps≤0.05; surprise was a negative and significant predictor of CBI scores, b=-0.20, 
SE=0.09, p≤0.05; and sadness was not a significant predictor of CBI scores, b=-0.02, SE=0.12, 
p=ns. The step two model was significant, F(6, 156)=4.41, p≤.001, R2=0.15, Adjusted R2=0.11,  
and accounted for a significantly greater proportion of variance in CBI scores over the step one 
model, F(5, 156)=4.38, p≤.001, Δ R2=0.13. Lastly, interaction terms for condition by affect were 
 30 
entered into step three of the model; while this model was statistically significant, F(11, 
151)=2.43, p≤.01, R2=0.15, Adjusted R2=0.09, it did not account for a significantly greater 
proportion of variance than the step two model, F(5, 151)=0.19, p=ns, Δ R2≤.01. Owing both to 
the non-significance of the regression coefficients within the model and the lack of an improved 
accounting for CBI score variance over the step two model, the step three model suggests that 
there were no significant interactions between condition and post-manipulation affect.  
Discussion 
 As a result of booming interest in the meaning making process and posttraumatic growth, 
the psychological literature is now replete with studies assessing and analyzing the ways in 
which beliefs and worldviews are impacted by exposure to traumatic events. Scholars working in 
this area have developed a breadth of rich theoretical perspectives through which to view and 
study these processes. Despite significant advances in the understanding of meaning making and 
posttraumatic change, researchers have increasingly raised concerns about overreliance on one 
methodological paradigm for studying meaning making—the cross-sectional, retrospective, self-
report design—and have drawn attention to its limited utility in helping researchers answer 
outstanding questions regarding the meaning making process (Frazier et al., 2009; Park, 2010). 
However, trauma researchers working outside of the meaning making and posttraumatic change 
literatures have readily adopted the use of film in experimental settings as a means to explore 
pre- to post-traumatic change and track target outcomes longitudinally (Holmes & Bourne, 2008; 
Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessey, 2004). The current study aimed to explore the viability of 
employing the trauma film paradigm for studying belief and worldview change following 
exposure to a recording of news coverage of a mass trauma—the 2013 Boston Marathon 
bombings. By employing a prospective, longitudinal, and experimental design for the present 
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study, our study took an innovative approach to examining belief and worldview change 
following indirect exposure to mass trauma.  
  Because our application of the film trauma paradigm utilized film that had not been 
validated in previous research, our first step was to test whether our experimental and control 
condition films differed in their impact on participants. To assess this, we measured affective 
responses and subjective distress immediately following the manipulation in each condition. We 
found that participants exposed to the traumatic live footage of the Boston Marathon attacks 
reported significantly higher levels of anger, fear, sadness, surprise, and subjective distress as 
compared to participants in the control condition, providing evidence that participants in the 
experimental condition had an affective response that is congruent with a traumatic stress 
response (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Rachman, 2001). We assessed a form of affect, self-
assurance, that bore no conceptual relationship to a traumatic stress response; our finding that 
mean affective scores for self-assurance did not differ between conditions provided further 
support for the claim that affective responses to the experimental condition film were associated 
with a traumatic stress response and not simply a general affective arousal. Moreover, these 
findings corroborate research demonstrating that exposure to televised news reports of the 
Boston Marathon bombings produced traumatic stress responses in individuals who had no direct 
exposure to the event (Holman, Garfin, & Silver, 2014).  
 Having thus supported our first hypothesis that participants in the experimental condition 
would demonstrate an affective response to the experimental manipulation that would not be 
observed in the control condition, we then assessed if and how the experimental manipulation 
differentially impacted changes in beliefs and worldviews. Per our second hypothesis, if 
exposure to a mass traumatic event produced changes in beliefs, we would anticipate a 
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significant time-by-condition interaction, wherein beliefs and worldviews for participants in the 
experimental condition would change pre- to post-trauma exposure, whereas belief and 
worldviews for participants in the control condition would remain unaffected by the non-
traumatic control condition film. Our two (condition) by three (time) analyses of variance 
produced no significant interactions, thereby failing to support our second hypothesis. While 
significant main effects were found by time (e.g., as in beliefs about justice) and by condition 
(e.g., for beliefs in the centrality, satisfaction, and solidarity associated with American identity), 
these effects do not support our second hypothesis: In the case of the effects of time, the absence 
of a significant main effect of condition can be accounted for by the possibility that both the 
experimental and control conditions impacted these beliefs. Considering the high profile 
manhunt that followed the Boston Marathon attacks and the criminal charges brought against 
Edward Snowden, it is plausible that the substantive content of these films, and not their 
traumatic characteristics, drove condition-independent changes in beliefs about justice. Likewise, 
because the between-condition differences with respect to American identity were observed both 
pre- and post-manipulation, they cannot be attributed to the impact of the films in each condition.  
 Despite the absence of a time-by-condition interaction, the manipulations might have still 
had an impact on belief change at the within-group level. In other words, while mean differences 
in beliefs might not have differed between conditions over time, the experimental manipulation 
might still have accounted for a significant proportion of residual variance in change scores 
between time points (Gollwitzer, Christ, & Lemmer, 2014). While these analyses by-and-large 
confirmed our conclusions drawn from the analyses of variance—namely, that the experimental 
manipulation had little effect on changes in measured beliefs and worldviews—the experimental 
condition was found to account for a significant proportion of residual variance in change in 
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beliefs about the benevolence of people and presence of meaning in life between post-test (Time 
2) and follow-up (Time 3).  
 Viewed through the conventional lens of null hypothesis significance testing, these 
findings suggest that our experimental manipulation failed to produce a reliable change in 
beliefs. Even the two significant effects pertaining to beliefs in the benevolence of people and the 
presence of meaning in life at Time 3 are suspect; considering the number of analyses performed, 
it is very plausible that these effects reflect Type 1 chance errors due to sample-specific 
characteristics as opposed to genuine and dependable population wide effects. Indeed, many 
researchers within the psychological scientific community have raised alarms about the dubious 
practice of lending undue theoretical weight to effects that narrowly pass the conventional p<.05 
benchmark for statistical significance, and have drawn attention to the ways in which these 
practices produce a scientific corpus littered with false-positive findings (Bakker, van Dijk, & 
Wicherts, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).  
For these reasons, we are hesitant to place too great a value in these two significant 
findings, and maintain that our second hypothesis is not supported by these data. We strongly 
believe that replication of this work or appropriate variations thereof (e.g., employing video from 
a different mass trauma) is necessary (for a discussion of replication practices, see Lindsay, 
2015). This is especially true with regard to the significant finding that experimental condition 
accounted for a significant proportion of variance in residual change in beliefs about the 
benevolence of people from Time 2 to Time 3. The fact that this finding was only narrowly 
significant (i.e., p very near .05) raises suspicions concerning its replicability. An examination of 
group means raises more eyebrows: The remarkable longitudinal stability of mean scores among 
participants within the experimental condition contrasted against the comparatively greater 
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longitudinal variably in mean scores within the control condition suggests random variability, 
and not the quasi-traumatic nature of the film in the experimental condition, is the primary cause 
of this statistically significant and theoretically inconsistent finding.  
Whereas the statistically significant finding regarding the impact of the manipulation on 
beliefs in the benevolence of others seems suspect on closer examination, the significant finding 
that experimental condition accounted for a significant proportion of variance in the presence of 
meaning in life from Time 2 to Time 3 appears more empirically and theoretically valid. Not 
only is the magnitude of this effect comparatively larger than any other observed manipulation 
effect among the analyses performed, but this finding corroborates theory in expected ways: 
According to the meaning making model, we would anticipate that exposure to traumatic 
material that violates core beliefs would be followed by a search for meaning that, ultimately, 
would increase presence of meaning in life (Park, 2010). Certainly, there are other plausible 
accounts for this finding: For instance, research demonstrates that college students who feel 
supported in their college environments report a greater sense of meaning in life as compared to 
those who do not (Shin & Steger, 2016); considering that a majority of our sample were first year 
college students, observed increases in presence of meaning in life could reflect adaptive 
adjustment to collegiate life rather than the end result of a meaning making process following 
our manipulation. Yet, we would not expect such an effect to be isolated exclusively to 
participants in the experimental condition. As such, we see this finding as tentative evidence in 
support of the efficacy of the trauma film paradigm in effecting changes in a sense of meaning in 
life. However, considering the novelty of our use of the trauma film paradigm in research on 
meaning making and belief change, future research should replicate this work in order to assess 
the durability of this finding.  
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In addition to finding that presence of meaning in life among participants in the 
experimental condition was impacted by the manipulation, we also found a significance group 
difference with respect to participants’ retrospective appraisal of the extent to which the events 
depicted in each condition initiated a re-examination of core beliefs, thereby providing tentative 
support for our third hypothesis. Further analysis, however, revealed that this difference was 
attributable primarily to affective responses to the films. This finding underscores the central role 
of affect and emotional processing in trauma (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Rachman, 2001). 
Moreover, it is consistent with the trauma film paradigm literature: A meta-analysis of 16 trauma 
film paradigm experiments found that an absence of posttraumatic flashbacks following the 
manipulation were associated with low affective response (Clark, Mackay, & Holmes, 2014). To 
our knowledge, this finding is the first to demonstrate that affective responses to a trauma film 
paradigm manipulation are associated with participants’ perceptions of retrospective core belief 
change.  
Intriguingly, however, participants’ perceptions of retrospective belief change were not 
corroborated by our aforementioned attempts to directly measure belief change. Taken together, 
these findings echo the conclusions drawn by Frazier et al. (2009) regarding differences in 
perceived posttraumatic growth versus actual posttraumatic growth—namely, that retrospective, 
self-reported posttraumatic growth is not reflected in directly measured longitudinal changes. 
Based on the current study, we tentatively conclude that perceived core belief change is not 
reflected by actual core belief change. However, our findings have the advantage of being drawn 
from an experimental study that exposed participants to a single quasi-traumatic event, thereby 
providing greater internal validity to our results by reducing variance in the timing of the 
stressful event and eliminating the heterogeneity in traumatic events reported in correlational 
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designs, such as are typically employed in meaning-making research (Frazier et al., 2009; Park, 
2010). Moreover, our direct measurement of affect immediately following the manipulation gave 
us the capacity to assess its role in the meaning making process. The critical role that immediate 
post-traumatic event affective responses plays in the meaning making process has been 
heretofore under-examined on account of the near impossibility of making such assessments 
using correlational study designs.  
For these reasons, findings from our study may provide new insight into the meaning 
making process. For instance, research by Heintzelman and King (2014) have brought to the fore 
a conception of “meaning-as-information,” wherein perceptions of meaninglessness and 
incoherence may catalyze the meaning making process independent of affective experience. 
From this perspective, traumatic incidents may produce an experience that is high in negative 
affect and low in sense of meaning, and while these two traumatic response often co-occur with 
one another, they may not always do so, and therefore may have different impacts on 
posttraumatic change processes (Heintzelman & King, 2014). Search for meaning did increase 
immediately following the manipulation among participants in the experimental condition (albeit 
not significantly), which would lend some credence to the notion that our manipulation produced 
an experience of low meaning, and the significant growth in presence of meaning in life in the 
experimental group from post-manipulation to one-month follow-up provides further evidence, 
consistent with the “meaning-as-information” approach, that meaning may instigate the meaning 
making process.  
By the same token, our data also provide tentative support to the perspective that 
meaning making occurs by way of emotional processes and the construal of posttraumatic 
growth narratives (Eid, Johnsen, & Saus, 2005; Maček, 2014; McAdams, 2006; Rachman, 2001; 
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Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Affective responses to the experimental condition film significantly 
predicted retrospective reports of participants having “seriously re-examined” their core beliefs, 
but in the absence of any directly measurable belief change. From this vantage point, it could be 
argued that perceiving oneself as having interrogated or reformed one’s worldview in the 
aftermath of trauma is more important than having actually interrogated or reformed them (e.g., 
as in Frazier et al., 2009). Taken to an extreme, we might surmise that perceptions of 
posttraumatic belief change, rather than serving as the actual mechanism by which posttraumatic 
growth and meaning making processes occur, is simply an unrecognized and potentially 
fictitious component of the redemption myth that characterizes the life narratives of so many 
Americans (McAdams, 2006).  
Perhaps our enduring fascination with the myth of the phoenix lies in a deeply human 
longing that, through loss and tragedy, we can be reborn as people far greater than we previously 
imagined—even when we are, in essence, the same people we have always been. Or, perhaps, 
the limitations and conventions of our statistical analyses (e.g., Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 
2012) prevent us from appreciating the very real changes that traumas inspire in the context of 
our experiment. As an example, consider these data through the lens of terror management 
theory: Terrorist attacks such as the Boston Marathon bombings simultaneously raise awareness 
of human mortality and, in instances such as this, desecrate cherished cultural landmarks or 
shared cultural spaces. On the basis of theory and prior research, we should expect that mass 
terrorist incidents like these should instigate a defense of cultural worldviews and a strengthened 
identification with a valued in-group (Arndt & Vess, 2008; Morgan, Wisneski, & Skitka, 2011). 
The solidarity among Americans generally, and Bostonians specifically, following the Boston 
Marathon that was captured by the “Boston Strong” movement emphasized national solidarity 
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with Bostonians, unity among Bostonians, and the strength and resilience of the city’s affected 
communities (e.g., Buhrmester et al., 2015; Ferrer & Conley, 2015). Even so, by the conventions 
of null hypothesis significance testing, the remarkable collective meaning making process that 
was embodied in the “Boston Strong” movement were not seen in our data.  
The time lapse between the actual event and our experimental manipulation may 
accurately account for this. Even so, our data do show non-significant increases in relevant 
outcomes (i.e., in-group homogeneity and in-group solidarity) immediately post-manipulation 
that would have supported our hypotheses were they statistically significant. It is not our 
intention to make a mountain out of a molehill for the purpose of inflating the importance of our 
data; rather, we raise these considerations to encourage future researchers to consider employing 
the trauma film paradigm in the context of exploring hypotheses derived from terror 
management theory.  
Limitations 
 In applying the trauma film paradigm to the study of meaning making and belief change, 
we sought to apply a methodology that would eschew the limitations of the frequently employed 
retrospective, correlational study designs commonly used in this field of research. Nevertheless, 
the trauma film paradigm, and our particular application of it, is not without its own limitations. 
First and foremost, both study conditions employed films whose content focused on national 
events that have garnered heavy and repeated news coverage. With respect to the Boston 
Marathon bombing, past news coverage itself has already been demonstrated to have had an 
impact on national mental health (Holman, Garfin, & Silver, 2014). As such, the events shown to 
participants were, in all likelihood, ones with which they had great familiarity. It is conceivable 
that meaning violations caused by these events might have been successfully resolved by 
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participants long before exposure to our manipulation. As previously noted, we chose to use 
news footage from the Boston Marathon bombing on account of the anticipated salience of this 
event for American cultural worldviews and the proximal nature of the threat for the typical 
American. However, future research might employ film from a traumatic event that researchers 
can reasonably assume Americans have not previously witnessed and have not assimilated into 
their pre-existing worldviews (e.g., footage of a mass trauma from overseas that has not gotten 
significant coverage in the United States).  
 The current study measured beliefs and worldviews that have theoretical relevance to 
shattered assumptions theory, meaning making theory, and terror management theory. Despite 
our attempts to be reasonably comprehensive in our measurement of beliefs and worldviews that 
bear on extant theory, the cornucopia of beliefs and worldviews that might be measured far 
outnumber those we assessed (Koltko-Rivera, 2004). Considering the nature of the films we 
employed, beliefs pertaining to intergroup relations, spiritual growth, and/or political goings-on, 
to name just a few, might have been affected by our manipulation. Future research should 
diversify the range of measured worldviews in an effort to identify those that have the most 
significant implications for meaning and belief development.  
Our study relied on a sample of college students. Emerging adults attending college are 
besieged by a competing array of developmental, relational, and contextual forces that 
simultaneously influence their beliefs and worldviews (Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001; 
Gutierrez & Park, 2015; Nelson & Padilla-Walker, 2013). Amidst the sturm und drang that 
characterizes this critical phase of personality development, the impact of a 10-minute film-
based manipulation may have simply been drowned in a sea of other more proximal conflicts and 
crises affecting this particular population. It behooves future researchers employing the trauma 
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film paradigm to account for personal traumas in assessing the impact of their manipulations on 
meaning-related outcomes. In addition, future research should consider recruiting non-college 
samples in studies that aim to assess meaning and belief change with the trauma film paradigm.   
Lastly, while nomothetic conclusions concerning the process of belief change may, with 
qualification, be drawn from trauma film research, mass traumatic events are embedded in a 
time, place, and culture that make them inherently idiographic (Maček, 2014). Our study’s 
methodology relied on the use of a traumatic event situated in a very specific place and time. As 
time passes and specific mass traumatic events recede into history, individuals’ assessments of 
the meaning of these events will undoubtedly be affected by other interceding historical events in 
tandem with changes in their personal lives. Depending on the theoretical aims of a given 
research project, this observation may alternatively be viewed as a strength or a weakness: While 
such a consideration complicates the production of time-independent generalizable knowledge 
about psychological processes pertaining to posttraumatic change and meaning making following 
mass trauma, it gives cultural psychologists, ethnographers, sociologists, and historians a 
snapshot of people’s understanding of the cultural events affecting them in a specific historical 
moment in time. Only through the application of nomothetic models of meaning making to 
idiographic events situated in specific time and place can we refine the science of posttraumatic 
change and meaning making in order to best conceptualize, predict, and respond to mass 
traumatic events and the responses that people have to them.    
Conclusion 
 On the basis of our findings, we believe that the trauma film paradigm holds great 
promise for advancing the psychological science of posttraumatic change and meaning making 
processes, and we encourage traumatologists and meaning making researchers to add the trauma 
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film paradigm to their methodological toolkits. Our findings demonstrate that the trauma film 
paradigm produces changes in affect and meaning that correspond to theorized posttraumatic 
responses and meaning making processes.  In light of the plethora of theoretical perspectives on 
these phenomena, however, our data can be reasonably accounted for by equally plausible 
theoretical accounts. Through diversification and repeated application of this methodology, we 
anticipate that the trauma film paradigm will extend and inform the science of posttraumatic 
change and meaning making.  
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Table 1     
Schedule of Study Administration and Measures   
Methods and Measures Prescreen (T0) Pre-film (Time 1) Film (Time 2) Post-film (Time 3) 
Administration     
 Administration Site Online Online In Laboratory Online 
 Informed Consent  ✔ ✔  
 Experimental Manipulation (Video)   ✔  
 Attentional Check   ✔  
 Debrief    ✔ 
Measures      
 Directly affected by Boston Marathon bombing ✔    
 Demographic Information  ✔   
 World Assumptions Scale (WAS; Janoff-Bulman, 1989)  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 American Identity (adapted from Leach et al., 2008)  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ; Steger et al., 2006)  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 Affective Response (adapted from PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1992)   ✔  
 Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1969)   ✔ ✔ 
 Core Beliefs Inventory (CBI; Cann et al., 2010)    ✔ 
 Impact of Events Scale-Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997)    ✔ 
Note. Prescreen (T0) occurred at the beginning of either the Fall 2014 or Spring 2014 semester. Pre-film (T1) measures were administered two weeks prior to the film 
(T2) administration, and post-film (T3) measures were administered four weeks following the film (T2) administration. 
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Table 2    
Means, Standard Deviations, and Internal Consistencies of Study Variables 
 Time 1 (Two weeks pre-film) Time 2 (Immediately post-film) Time 3 (One month post-film) 
 Experimental Control  Experimental Control  Experimental Control  
Variable M SD M SD Cronbach’s α M SD M SD Cronbach’s α M SD M SD Cronbach’s α 
World Assumptions                
 Benevolent world 4.25 0.80 3.95 0.78 0.75 4.03 0.95 3.94 0.87 0.82 4.04 0.98 4.01 0.87 0.85 
 Benevolent people 4.27 0.76 4.16 0.60 0.64 4.33 0.80 4.31 0.69 0.71 4.33 0.80 4.10 0.78 0.72 
 Controllability 3.49 0.84 3.37 0.81 0.73 3.19 0.96 3.21 0.93 0.82 3.26 0.92 3.30 1.04 0.85 
 Justice 3.63 0.85 3.40 0.82 0.72 3.25 0.94 3.30 0.89 0.76 3.43 0.76 3.42 0.98 0.75 
 Luck 4.44 0.81 4.19 0.95 0.79 4.45 0.83 4.36 0.93 0.79 4.37 0.97 4.28 0.93 0.87 
 Randomness 3.79 0.84 3.56 0.81 0.67 3.79 1.01 3.64 0.88 0.77 3.73 0.87 3.72 0.94 0.77 
 Self-control 4.62 0.67 4.53 0.73 0.76 4.44 0.79 4.36 0.83 0.76 4.31 0.88 4.25 0.89 0.83 
 Self-esteem 4.80 1.08 4.64 0.93 0.85 5.04 0.93 4.91 0.97 0.87 4.78 1.05 4.63 1.01 0.87 
American Identity                
 Centrality 4.85 1.32 4.36 1.34 0.82 4.91 1.12 4.42 1.34 0.81 4.75 1.25 4.48 1.30 0.86 
 In-group homogeneity 4.09 1.45 4.00 1.31 0.89 4.43 1.39 4.43 1.41 0.91 4.46 1.23 4.57 1.39 0.92 
 Satisfaction 5.76 1.04 5.44 0.95 0.87 5.70 0.88 5.44 0.92 0.88 5.56 0.90 5.30 0.96 0.88 
 Self-stereotyping 4.86 1.37 4.60 1.20 0.87 4.94 1.23 4.71 1.26 0.89 4.78 1.29 4.61 1.19 0.91 
 Solidarity 5.12 1.16 4.72 1.14 0.84 5.25 1.03 4.83 1.28 0.88 5.12 1.06 4.82 1.29 0.91 
Meaning in Life                
 Presence 4.70 1.23 4.70 1.08 0.84 4.70 1.30 4.71 0.94 0.86 4.83 1.08 4.55 1.12 0.84 
 Search 4.91 1.35 5.11 1.17 0.89 5.17 1.16 5.11 1.13 0.90 4.91 1.14 4.90 1.14 0.90 
Affect                
 Fear - - - - - 3.41 1.20 1.69 0.74 0.87 - - - - - 
 Hostility - - - - - 3.87 1.20 2.11 1.02 0.78 - - - - - 
 Sadness - - - - - 3.88 1.10 1.44 0.66 0.89 - - - - - 
 Self-assurance - - - - - 1.87 0.81 1.90 0.89 0.65 - - - - - 
 Surprise - - - - - 3.19 1.18 2.15 0.94 0.72 - - - - - 
Attentional Check      4.42 0.75 4.81 0.45 -      
Subjective Units of Distress - - - - - 44.93 24.66 18.82 18.12 - 22.64 24.55 31.48 24.08 - 
Impact of Events Scale - - - - - - - - - - 1.59 0.67 1.75 0.91 .96 
Core Beliefs Inventory - - - - - - - - - - 2.37 1.08 2.00 1.24 .94 
Note. 
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Table 3    
Factorial Analyses of Variance assessing Effects of Time (3) by Condition (2) on Study Outcome Variables  (N=168) 
Variables Time Condition Time X Condition 
 SS MS F(2, 498) ηp2 SS MS F(1, 498) ηp2 SS MS F(2, 498) ηp2 
World Assumptions 
       
     
 Benevolent world 2.68 1.34 1.74 0.01 3.83 3.83 4.98* 0.01 1.73 0.86 1.12 <0.01 
 Benevolent people 0.22 0.11 0.20 <0.01 0.45 0.45 0.81 <0.01 0.88 0.44 0.80 <0.01 
 Controllability 4.07 2.03 2.41 0.01 0.60 0.60 0.71 <.01 0.59 0.30 0.35 <0.01 
 Justice 6.22 3.11 4.05* 0.02 2.14 2.14 2.79 0.01 1.77 0.89 1.15 <0.01 
 Luck 0.35 0.17 0.21 <0.01 2.64 2.64 3.24 0.01 0.77 0.38 0.47 <0.01 
 Randomness 0.17 0.08 0.11 <0.01 2.22 2.22 2.78 0.01 1.00 0.50 0.63 <0.01 
 Self-control 4.31 2.16 3.35* 0.01 0.35 0.35 0.55 <0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 <0.01 
 Self-esteem 3.44 1.72 1.73 0.01 1.06 1.06 1.06 <0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 <0.01 
American Identity             
 Centrality 1.05 0.53 0.32 <0.01 9.58 9.58 5.87* 0.01 1.26 0.63 0.39 <0.01 
 In-group homogeneity 6.85 3.43 1.84 0.01 0.35 0.35 0.19 <0.01 0.84 0.42 0.23 <0.01 
 Satisfaction 1.71 0.85 0.95 <0.01 4.21 4.21 4.70* 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.06 <0.01 
 Self-stereotyping 1.15 0.58 0.36 <0.01 2.74 2.74 1.73 <0.01 0.20 0.10 0.06 <0.01 
 Solidarity 1.04 0.52 0.39 <0.01 6.51 6.51 4.82* 0.01 0.38 0.19 0.14 <0.01 
Meaning in Life 
       
     
 Presence 0.98 0.49 0.38 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 2.23 1.17 0.91 <0.01 
 Search 3.76 1.18 1.34 0.01 1.68 1.68 1.20 <0.01 1.59 0.80 0.57 <0.01 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p <001.  
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Table 4   
Residual Change Score Regression Models for Time 2 and Time 3 Beliefs and Worldviews  
 World Assumptions 
 Benevolent World Benevolent People Controllability Justice Luck Randomness Self-Control Self-Esteem 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE 
T2 Belief 
       
 
 Condition -0.13 0.11 -0.05 0.09 -0.10 0.12 -0.20 0.11 -0.04 0.12 -0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.10 0.01 0.09 
 T1 Belief 0.73*** 0.07 0.71*** 0.06 0.71*** 0.07 0.67*** 0.07 0.51*** 0.07 0.73*** 0.07 0.64*** 0.07 0.76*** 0.04 
F 56.63*** 61.92*** 50.65*** 49.05*** 29.37*** 57.29*** 37.25*** 156.70*** 
df 2/165 2/165 2/165 2/165 2/165 2/165 2/165 2/165 
R2 0.41 0.43 0.38 0.37 0.26 0.41 0.31 0.66 
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.42 0.37 0.37 0.25 0.40 0.30 0.65 
T3 Belief 
       
 
 Condition -0.09 0.10 0.17* 0.08 -0.04 0.11 -0.04 0.10 -0.04 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.05 0.10 
 T2 Belief 0.59*** 0.07 0.42*** 0.07 0.63*** 0.07 0.46*** 0.07 0.46*** 0.08 0.53*** 0.08 0.55*** 0.08 0.68*** 0.09 
 T1 Belief  0.25** 0.08 0.49*** 0.08 0.20* 0.08 0.32*** 0.07 0.32** 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.1** 0.09 0.18* 0.09 
F 64.60*** 69.58*** 60.22*** 55.27*** 35.64*** 25.48*** 45.99*** 80.77*** 
df 3/164 3/163 3/163 3/164 3/163 3/164 3/164 3/163 
R2 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.50 0.40 0.32 0.46 0.60 
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.49 0.39 0.31 0.45 0.59 
 American Identity Meaning in Life 
 Centrality Homogeneity Satisfaction Self-Stereotyping Solidarity Presence Search 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE 
T2 Belief        
 Condition 0.14 0.13 -0.05 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.13 -0.01 0.11 0.17 0.14 
 T1 Belief 0.71*** 0.05 0.65*** 0.06 0.70*** 0.05 0.70*** 0.05 0.74*** 0.05 0.75*** 0.05 0.56*** 0.06 
F 119.30*** 56.00*** 123.90*** 89.92*** 98.56*** 118.00*** 50.23*** 
df 2/160 2/160 2/160 2/160 2/160 2/165 2/165 
R2 0.60 0.41 0.61 0.53 0.55 0.59 0.39 
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.40 0.60 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.37 
T3 Belief        
 Condition -0.11 0.13 -0.11 0.14 0.08 0.10 -0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.13 0.28** 0.10 0.02 0.14 
 T2 Belief 0.52*** 0.08 0.59*** 0.07 0.55*** 0.08 0.47*** 0.07 0.50*** 0.08 0.43*** 0.07 0.49*** 0.08 
 T1 Belief  0.30** 0.07 0.14* 0.07 0.24** 0.07 0.36*** 0.07 0.30*** 0.08 0.38*** 0.07 0.18** 0.07 
F 79.25** 62.14** 74.88*** 86.61*** 65.36*** 94.23*** 36.70*** 
df 3/159 3/159 3/159 3/159 3/159 3/163 3/163 
R2 0.60 0.54 0.59 0.62 0.55 0.63 0.40 
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.53 0.58 0.61 0.54 0.63 0.39 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p <001.  
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Table 5       
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Examination of Core Beliefs (CBI) by Condition and Post-Manipulation Affect 
 Step One Step Two Step Three 
Variables B SE B SE B SE 
Condition1 0.37* 0.18 -0.12 0.30 0.02 0.74 
Affect       
 Fear   0.22* 0.11 0.13 0.23 
 Hostility   0.22* 0.11 0.18 0.15 
 Sadness   -0.02 0.12 0.09 0.23 
 Self-assurance   0.24* 0.11 0.31 0.16 
 Surprise   -0.20* 0.09 -0.20 0.16 
Condition by Affect Interactions       
 Condition X Fear     0.10 0.26 
 Condition X Hostility     0.09 0.22 
 Condition X Sadness     -0.16 0.27 
 Condition X Self-assurance     -0.12 0.23 
 Condition X Surprise     -0.01 0.20 
F 4.12* 4.41*** 2.43*** 
df 1/161 6/156 11/151 
R2 0.02* 0.15*** 0.15 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.11*** 0.08 
ΔR2 - 0.13*** >0.01 
Note. 1Experimental condition=1, control condition=0. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p <.00. 
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Figure 1. Scatterplot of beliefs in the benevolence of people at immediate post-manipulation (x-
axis) and one-month follow-up (y-axis) by experimental condition. Regression lines for each 
condition are accompanied by confidence interval band in gray. Shaded area represents 95% 
confidence interval. Dotted gray line depicts points of no change in belief (i.e., Time 2 = Time 
3).   
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Figure 2. Scatterplot of presence of meaning in life at immediate post-manipulation (x-axis) and 
one-month follow-up (y-axis) by experimental condition. Regression lines for each condition are 
accompanied by confidence interval band in gray. Shaded area represents 95% confidence 
interval. Dotted gray line depicts points of no change in belief (i.e., Time 2 = Time 3).  
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Appendix A 
 
Attentional check questionnaire for the experimental condition: 
 
Based on the information presented in the video you just watched, please answer the following 
true or false questions to the best of your ability: 
 
(1)!The attacks in Boston consisted of four distinct explosions. False 
(2)!The explosions took place in downtown Boston. True 
(3)!The explosives were planted near the finish line of the Boston Marathon. True 
(4)!President Obama described the event as a “terrorist attack.” False 
(5)!April 15th is a state holiday in Massachusetts. True 
 
Attentional check questionnaire for the control condition: 
 
Based on the information presented in the video you just watched, please answer the following 
true or false questions to the best of your ability: 
 
(1)!U.S. government intelligence data mining started under the Bush administration. True 
(2)!Ari Fleisher (man on right) argued that the government should not conduct surveillance 
on law-abiding citizens. False 
(3)!Jim Walsh (man on left) participated in this broadcast from a news studio in Watertown, 
Massachusetts. True 
(4)!Senator Dianne Feinstein argued that government data mining is designed to protect 
Americans from future terrorist attacks. True 
(5)!Wolf Blitzer (host) took a strong stance against government data mining.  False 
 
